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ABSTRACT:
The conventional view of the role of patents in the university research context
(and more generally) is that patent-enabled exclusivity improves the supply-side
functioning of markets for university research results (and inventions more
generally) as well as those markets further downstream for derivative commercial
end-products. The reward, prospect, and commercialization theories of patent law
take patent-enabled exclusivity as the relevant means for fixing a supply-side
problem—the undersupply of private investment in the production of patentable
subject matter or in the development and commercialization of patentable subject
matter that would occur in the absence of patent-enabled exclusivity. Put another
way, patents attract private investment to productive activities that might
otherwise be less attractive investments. The reason why is rather straightforward
and well-understood. Without patents, the fruits of the investments, intellectual
fruit, would be too easily accessed and used by others without compensation to
the original investor, thus undermining the incentive to invest in the first place.
This is the standard public goods story that serves as the textbook explanation for
why we have a patent system.
While the supply-side view of the role of patents is important, a view from the
demand-side is needed to fully appreciate the role of patents in the university
research context (and more generally) and to fully inform university decisions
about the extent to and manner in which they participate in patenting and
commercializing research. Introducing patents into the university research
system, along with a host of other initiatives aimed at tightening the relationship
between universities and industry, is (primarily) aimed at increasing connectivity
between university science and technology research systems and the demands of
industry for both university research outputs (including research results and
human capital) and upstream infrastructural capital necessary to produce such
outputs.
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In this essay, I explore how university science and technology research systems
perform economically as infrastructural capital and explain how these systems
generate social value. I explain the dual role of patents in the university research
context. On the supply side, patents facilitate the transfer (or “push”) of
university research to industry. On the demand side, patents attract (or “pull”)
university resources to meet industry demands. I focus on the demand side
dynamic and explain how “patent pull” in the university research context may
lead to a slow and subtle shift in the allocation of critical infrastructure resources
within universities. I explore what this means for both universities and society,
and conclude with some observations about how universities might approach
these issues strategically.
Approaching the role of patents from the demand side is an entirely new
enterprise, and it is critical to understanding the role of patents in the university
context and more generally. Thus, in conclusion, I also make a few suggestions
about future avenues of research in this area.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

There are substantial, growing literatures debating the merits of
commercializing universities and university research.1 The legal and economic
literatures in particular focus extensively on university research results, and most
often on how research results are managed, developed, licensed, transferred,
priced, and used.2 The use of patents within the university research system as a
tool to encourage and indeed enable technology transfer, utilization and
commercialization has been lauded by some as a major success and criticized by
others as a major failure. Those who claim success focus on increased rates of
patenting, licensing and commercialization.3 Patents encourage and enable
transactions; they serve as the focal point for researchers, technology transfer
officers, lawyers, venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, engineers, marketers, and
other participants in the commercialization process. Without patents, the
proponents argue, potentially valuable research languishes underutilized.4 On the
1

Not surprisingly, different literatures approach the commercialization question from different
perspectives, some focusing broadly on the university on the whole and others focusing more
narrowly on university research. As a law professor who teaches and writes about the law and
economics of intellectual property, I approach the debate, at least initially, from the legal and
economic literatures and with a focus on the role of patents on university research. As I explain
below, however, I propose a new and important, intermediate level of analysis—in between
university-focused and university research-focused—that considers commercialization of the
university science and technology research system. I do not delve into the literature on
institutional resource allocation, which focuses on the allocation of resources among university
departments. See Cindy S. Volk et al., Models of Institutional Resource Allocation: Mission,
Market, and Gender, 72 J. HIGHER EDUCATION 387 (2001).
2

The economic and legal literatures are voluminous. See, e.g., David C. Mowery, Richard R.
Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat and Arvids A. Ziedonis, IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION:
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
(2004); DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE, (Princeton University Press 2003);
BRANSCOMB, ET AL., INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE (1999); ETZKOWITZ, ET AL., CAPITALIZING
KNOWLEDGE (1998); HENRY ETZKOWITZ, MIT AND THE RISE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL SCIENCE
(2002); GROSS, NEW IDEA FACTORY (2000); Ajay Agrawal, University-to-industry knowledge
transfer: literature review and unanswered questions, I.J.M.R. (Dec. 2001); Cohen, W., R.
Florida, L. Randazzese, and J. Walsh, Industry and the Academy: Uneasy Partners in the Cause of
Technological Advance, in CHALLENGES TO THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY (R. Noll, ed., 1998);
Rebecca Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97
YALE L. J. 177 (1987); Rebecca Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L. J. 721
(1990); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996); Arti Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research; Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 77 (1999); Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of
U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347 (2000); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights
and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); J.H. Reichman
& Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Commons For Scientific Data in a Highly
Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (2003).
3

See generally BOK, supra note 2 (arguing that the Bayh-Dole Act and patents enabled
universities to do a better job serving the public interest).
4

See id.; Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules, supra note 2 (arguing that the primary role of
patents is to facilitate commercialization).
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other hand, those who claim failure focus on transaction costs, patent “thickets,”
deadweight losses, increased costs to the public, increased secrecy, and shifts in
academic norms.5
Patents, they argue, are unnecessary impediments to
widespread, competitive utilization of research results that the public already has
paid for.6
This debate is by no means resolved. Its resolution will depend upon
continued empirical testing of the various types of costs and benefits that each
side has highlighted. Moreover, the strength of the arguments offered by each side
will vary considerably across research areas (for example, compare computer
science, biotechnology and materials science) and across research result types (for
example, compare upstream basic research, midstream research tools, and
downstream commercial technology).7 With the exception of some discussion of
academic norms, most of the attention in this debate within the legal literature is
focused on research results—the outputs from the research process.8
In this essay, I shift focus away from the management of outputs. That is,
I will not address the arguments noted above about whether patents improve or
worsen dissemination and use of university research results. Instead, I focus on
the manner in which patents affect (i) the type or nature of the outputs produced;
(ii) the process of research and other related university-based processes; and
mostly, even further upstream, (iii) the university science and technology research
system itself. As explained in more detail below,
university science and technology (S&T) research system refers to
the system of complementary university resources—financial,
governance, human, intellectual, and physical capital resources—
that together act as inputs into different types of productive
processes—including research, education, training, and
socialization—that generate a wide range of socially valuable
research outputs—intellectual and human capital (research results
and skilled people).
5

See Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 2; see also Eisenberg, Patenting the Human
Genome, supra note 2, at 738 (discussing the possible costs and benefits of providing patents for
publicly funded research of human genomes); Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 2,
at 88; Reichman & Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Commons, supra note 2, at 320
(recognizing increased intellectual property rights discourage traditional sharing of scientific
findings).

6

See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 2; see also Brett Frischmann & Mark
Lemley, Spillovers, Working Paper (2005) (discussing the advantages of widespread competitive
utilization over coordination).
7

See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 160015 (2003) (discussing how different theories are more relevant to different industries depending on
a particular industry’s needs and capabilities).
8

See Brett Frischmann, A Process-oriented View of Intellectual Property, Working Paper (200506) (arguing that intellectual property law and scholarship tends to be “output-focused” and pays
insufficient attention to the intellectual processes that yield outputs).
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While patent scholars debate the impact of patents on the management of
university research, they pay scant attention to potential impacts of patents on the
university research system itself. This essay, by contrast, draws attention to the
role of patents in commercializing the university S&T research system.
Given limits in government funding of research, universities have begun
to pursue and employ patents aggressively to transfer technology, encourage
entrepreneurship and generate revenues that may support research efforts. While
some universities have found tremendous success in pursuing commercial
avenues, the vast majority have not.9 Yet many still continue to make
participation in the patenting and commercialization process a priority.10
Universities face incredibly difficult, complex decisions concerning the
degree to which they ought to participate in commercialization of research.11
While limited government funds may be the immediate, most visible factor
forcing such decisions upon universities,12 there are more fundamental forces at
work. In Academic Capitalism,13 Sheila Slaughter and Larry Leslie present a
compelling argument that globalization, changing economic conditions, and other
macro-level factors are increasing pressure on universities on the whole to behave
more and more like market actors.
Another (complementary) explanation can be found in the dominant
economic mindset that has emerged in the past few decades. This mindset
9

See Jay Kesan, Tech-Transfer Offices As Intermediaries (On Their Own Terms), Working paper,
presented at W(h)ither the Middleman: The Role and Future of Intermediaries in the Information
Age, Michigan State University College of Law, April 8-9, 2005, East Lansing, Michigan
(analyzing success rates and trends in patenting behavior at U.S. universities); Aldo Geuna &
Lionel Nesta, University patenting and its effects on academic research. The emerging European
evidence, RESEARCH POLICY (forthcoming 2005) (analyzing success rates and trends in patenting
behavior at European universities).
10

See Kesan, supra; NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION REPORT, ACADEMIC PATENTING: PATENTS
AWARDED
TO
U.S.
UNIVERSITIES,
(1996),
available
at
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind96/ch5_acad.htm (same); Rebecca Henderson, et al., Universities
as a Source of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965-1988
,
80 REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 119 (1996).
11

See SHEILA SLAUGHTER & LARRY LESLIE, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM (1997); James Stuart, The
Academic-Industrial Complex: A Warning to Universities, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1042
(2004); see generally Jennifer Croissant & Sal Restivo, DEGREES OF COMPROMISE: INDUSTRIAL
INTEREST AND ACADEMIC VALUES (SUNY Press 2001).
12

Committee on Trends in Federal Spending on Scientific and Engineering Research, Board on
Science, Technology and Economic Policy, National Research Council, TRENDS IN FEDERAL
SUPPORT OF RESEARCH AND GRADUATE EDUCATION, 21-44 (2001), National Academies Press,
available at http://www.nap.edu/nap-cgi/skimit.cgi?isbn=0309075890&chap=21-48; see also The
NSF Budget: How Should We Determine Future Levels?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Res.
Committee. on Sci. House of Rep., 107th Cong. 107-62 (2002) 11-13 (discussing the drop in
funding for the National Science Foundation).
13

SLAUGHTER & LARRY LESLIE, supra note 11.
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focuses on the perceived social benefits of commercialization, privatization and
deregulation, on minimizing government intervention in markets, and arguably on
maximizing market intervention into government and academia, although
proponents of such increased reliance on the market mechanism would not put it
this way.14 As Paul Krugman recently noted, “Decades of conservative marketing
have convinced Americans that government programs always create bloated
bureaucracies, while the private sector is always lean and efficient.”15 In my
opinion, universities often are typecast like government in a manner that
marginalizes their social and economic contributions and their respective roles in
society. Along with a glorified view of the market and a pessimistic view of
government, universities are cast as ivory tower havens for (liberal) academics out
of touch with reality and the demands of society.
This is not the place to develop these arguments fully, but I raise them to
suggest that the commercialization question is not unique to the university
research context but rather is endemic to evolving notions of modern societal
organization in capitalist economies.16 To grapple with the commercialization
question, universities should step back from their immediate context, compare
their situation with that of other industries and social contexts, reflect on their role
in society, and proceed carefully.
In this essay, I explore how university science and technology research
systems perform economically as infrastructural capital, explain how these
systems generate value, and help reframe the commercialization question. I
explain the subtle demand-side role of patents in the university science and
technology research system and how the availabilityof patents , coupled with
scarce government funding, may lead to a creeping systemic optimization—a
slow and subtle shift in the allocation of infrastructure resources and research
14

In his book, MIT and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science, Henry Etzkowitz suggests that
“reorient[ing] the universities toward a commercial role was not intervention in the sense of
specific government measures requiring targeting of particular areas of R&D for support, as in
Japan, or requiring enterprises and research institutes to make research contracts with each other,
as in the Eastern European socialist model. Instead, incentives were built into the researchfunding system to move universities closer to industry, in their motivation and structure.”
ETZKOWITZ, MIT AND THE RISE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 125. Etzkowitz
is reassured that the government is not overtly intervening into academia, but fails to appreciate
fully the risks of industry intervention, which I discuss below.

15

Buying Into Failure, NY Times, Op. Ed. (Dec. 17, 2004).

16

In three previous articles, I have argued that the dominant economic mindset ignores critical
social and economic values and that over-reliance on the market mechanism may involve
significant social (opportunity) costs that escape consideration within conventional economic
analyses. In these articles, I used the tools of the economics discipline to challenge the dominant
economic mindset as it pertains to specific areas. See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions:
supra note 2; Brett Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet
Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government Intervention
into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 51 (June 8, 2001) at
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=2&article=1 (last visited Dec. 14, 2004); Brett Frischmann,
An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005).
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priorities. This optimization is not simply an adjustment in incentives, an
“incentive shift” for researchers to “better” align their incentives with the
commercialization objective and thereby encourage more efficient technology
transfer, which boils down to more efficient supply of university derived
technology to downstream commercial markets. While this is part of the
dynamic, it is critical that universities take a wider view and recognize the
demand-side effects of commercialization.
The role of patents in the university research context (and the
commercialization question more generally) is not simply about using patentenabled exclusivity to fix the supply-side problem of underutilization of
government funded research results; it is also if not primarily about increasing
connectivity between university science and technology research systems and the
demands of industry for both university research outputs (research results and
human capital) and the infrastructural capital necessary to generating those
outputs.
The U.S. government has made an explicit policy decision to allow funded
entities to obtain patents and thereby has encouraged participation in the
commercialization of federally funded research. The Bayh-Dole Act17 enables
universities to participate in the commercialization process, but it does not
obligate or constrain them to pursue any particular strategy with respect to
federally funded research.18 Universities must decide carefully the extent to
which they wish to participate in the commercialization process.19 As Richard
Florida has argued, “universities need to be more vigilant in managing the
process” and should “reconsider their more aggressive policies toward technology
transfer and particularly regarding the ownership of intellectual property.”20
Universities remain in the driver’s seat and may decide which road to take and at
what speed.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows: Part II discusses
university science and technology research systems and explains how they
perform economically [as infrastructural capital]. Part III explains how patents
were introduced based on “supply-side” reasoning without due care for “demandside” issues. It then describes how patents create a demand-pull for optimization
created by market-driven incentives in the university research context. Part IV
suggests that universities have a choice and must carefully decide on the degree to
which they participate in commercialization. Part V concludes.
17

Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3019 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200Œ 211) (2000).
18

C.f. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development, supra note 2, at 1700 (noting that
university support for the Bayh-Dole Act was in part due to their ability to control their
interactions with commercial entities).
19

See Rai, supra note 2.

20

Richard Florida, The Role of the University: Leveraging Talent, Not Technology, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY ONLINE (Summer 1999), at http://www.isues.org/issues/15.4/florida.htm.
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II.

UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH SYSTEMS

A university science and technology research system is a system of
productive resources aggregated within a university setting and used to produce a
stream of research-related outputs.21 The system is comprised of at least five
different sets of related, complementary resources, including:
1. human capital, including complementary networks of people such as
professors, researchers, students, administrators, technicians, and other
support staff;22
2. governance capital, such as rules, norms, policies and other collective
constraints that guide system participants’ behavior;
3. physical capital, such as land, facilities and equipment;
4. intellectual capital, such as knowledge, information, and ideas;23 and
5. financial capital.
Each of these capital resources is an essential component of the system, although
the bundle of such resources and manner in which they are bundled varies
considerably across universities. I have referred to the various components of the
system as capital because, aggregated together within a university, these
resources are used collectively and continuously as inputs into a variety of
production processes, including research, education, training, and socialization,
among others.
[insert Figure One (at the end)]
These production processes yield a wide variety of research-related
outputs, which can be grouped into two major categories—intellectual capital and
human capital. Intellectual capital outputs24 are the intangible information goods,
21

Of course, these resources also produce other important outputs as well, e.g., educated citizens.

22

Florida focuses on the importance of attracting and aggregating human capital within the
university science and technology system as a means of improving its performance. He notes that
universities must attract the “top talent,” referring to academic research professors, in order to
attract the top graduate students. Florida emphasizes the need to shift our myopic focus on
research results (e.g., university derived invention) to human capital, in terms of both human
capital outputs and human capital as a component of infrastructural capital. See Florida, The Role
of the University, supra note 20.
23

The intellectual capital category is meant to capture the full range of intangible products of the
human intellect, regardless of whether the product has been fixated in a tangible medium (i.e.,
written down) and regardless of whether any particular entity claims ownership of the intellectual
good. Intellectual capital often overlaps significantly with human capital. For example, the idea
residing in the mind of a professor is an intellectual resource while the professor is a human
capital resource.
24

I recognize that the term “capital outputs” seems like an oxymoron, but it is not. It is important
to realize that capital goods are produced and thus are outputs of a production process, especially
when evaluating streams of cumulative input-output relationships.
8

essentially the research results, which may or may not be embedded in some
artifact (e.g., equipment design), be fixated in some tangible form (e.g., written
down), or simply reside in the minds of researchers. Generally, when we refer to
“science,” “research,” “invention,” “innovation,” “technology,” and so on, we are
talking about various types of intellectual capital that are outputs from some
intellectual process. These outputs are public goods with varying potential to
yield positive externalities (or conversely, appropriable benefits) when utilized
productively further downstream. The types of downstream uses may vary
considerably, and so can the variance itself.25
Equally if not more important than pure intellectual capital outputs—
research results—are human capital outputs—people with (a) higher levels of
education, knowledge, experience, and research-oriented skills (b) who are
prepared for entry into the research community.26 The importance of human
capital outputs is well-understood. Many commentators, such as Richard Florida,
have emphasized the critical role of U.S. universities in educating and training
(graduate) students—in creating “talent” that fuels the knowledge economy.
Education, knowledge, experience, and research-oriented skills must be absorbed
by students and consequently often are standard (in contrast with the cutting edge
nature of the research result outputs). Once absorbed through the processes of
research, education and training, the intellectual capital residing within the
university science and technology research system is disseminated and shared.
Thus, research-oriented education, knowledge, experience, and skills may be
viewed as forms of intellectual capital that are disseminated to students and used
productively to augment their human capital.
Both intellectual and human capital outputs generate value when used
productively as inputs downstream. As Figure Two illustrates, “downstream” use
of these outputs may entail use in further research (internally or externally) or use
in commercialization processes (internally or externally).

25

See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 2.

26

It is important to realize that socialization is an important aspect of the university science and
technology research system. Students are prepared for entry into the research community, for
example, by gaining familiarity with professional norms and ethics and forming relationships with
members of the community. Most undergraduate or graduate students have limited real-world
experience and very little (if any) experience in dealing with professionals as a member of the
professional community. In law school, for example, we place a significant emphasis on the fact
that students will be entering a profession, that they will be members of the bar, and that a host of
ethical and even less formal community norms apply to members. The law school experience, in
part, consists of a socialization process that prepares the students for professional membership. A
very similar dynamic exists within the university research setting, although it is less explicit and
less formal than in the law school setting. Katherine Strandburg has indirectly touched on this
dynamic. She explores the relationships between community norms and academic scientists’
individual preferences. See Katherine Strandburg, Curiosity-driven research and university
technology transfer, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ELSEVIER SCIENCE/JAI PRESS SERIES:
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2005).
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[insert figure two (at the end)]
For the most part, then, universities are “vertically integrated” with respect to the
production of research systems and research-related outputs; some outputs are
consumed internally while others are consumed externally. The manner in which
the outputs are used depends, of course, on the nature of the specific outputs.
Viewed as an integrated system of complementary resources that generate
value primarily when used to produce a stream of research-related outputs, the
university science and technology research system begins to look like other forms
of infrastructural capital.27
University science and technology research systems are “sharable” in the
sense that multiple users may access and use the system resources to engage in
productive processes and produce research-related outputs.28 Some components
of the system have infinite capacity (i.e., are purely nonrival in consumption)—
such as intellectual and governance capital—while others have finite capacity
(i.e., are rival in consumption)—such as physical, financial, and human capital. It
is the scarcity of these latter types of capital resources that drives both
competition for funding and prestige and resource allocation decisions. As
discussed below, to some extent, the rivalrousness29 of the system is what puts
pressure on universities to optimize the system for commercial outputs because
the appropriable benefits (revenues) generated by such outputs may provide the
resources necessary to sustain the system. (More on this dynamic below.)
University science and technology research systems, like road systems,
basic research, the Internet and many infrastructures,30 are socially valuable
primarily because of the productive activity they facilitate downstream. In other
words, the value created by these research systems is only realized when the
27

See Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16 (on different types of
infrastructure capital).

28

See id., at 956-57, 959 (explaining the economic significance of this characteristic); Brett M.
Frischmann, Peer-to-Peer Technology as Infrastructure: An Economic Argument For Retaining
Sony's Safe Harbor For Technologies Capable of Substantial Noninfringing Uses, 52 J.
COPYRIGHT SOCIETY 329, 332-33 (2005) (same); see also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or,
Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (on a particular class of sharable
goods); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On shareable goods and the emergence of sharing as a
modality of economic production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2005).
29

See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251,
1257 (2004) (Barnett describes the “first-mover” concept in which the first party to develop a new
innovation employs different economic tactics to maintain its market monopoly). See also
Katherine Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 85-6 (2004) (Strandburg explains that due to the Bayh-Dole Act and the
relationship between federally funded researchers and private actors “provides opportunities for
strategic behavior, such as firms’ placing of particular research projects into the nonprofit sector
so as to gain access to the patented technology of competitors.”)
30

Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16.
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research-related outputs are used downstream; essentially, the “value added” is
embedded in the outputs. Accordingly, to fully understand the social demand for
this type of infrastructure and to assess how well demand signals “manifest”
upstream,31 it is necessary to evaluate the output markets in terms of the nature of
the outputs produced, the extent to which such outputs generate (non)observable
and (non)appropriable value, and the manner in which value is distributed (for
example, is value realized only by consumers or are there external benefits to
nonconsumers).
Most university science and technology research systems served mixed
commercial, public, and social ends by enabling the downstream production of a
wide variety of private, public, and non-market goods. As a general matter,
university science and technology research systems do not directly yield private
goods for commercial markets (except to the extent that one takes the view that
human capital outputs constitute rival goods consumed in the labor market),
although these systems generate human and intellectual capital that may be used
externally to produce such goods.
University science and technology research systems produce a wide array
of public and non-markets goods that generate (or have the potential to generate)
significant positive externalities. This should not be a controversial point. It is
important to realize, however, that the human and intellectual capital outputs of
these systems have varying potentials to yield positive externalities and,
conversely, appropriable benefits. This variance can be understood in a few ways.
For a moment, put aside human capital outputs32 and focus on intellectual capital
outputs—research results that are pure public goods. The research results may
vary in terms of their genericness-specificity with respect to applications
downstream—that is, they may vary along the basic to applied continuum.33 The
research results also may vary in terms of the classes of applications—for
example, commercial, private goods production or noncommercial research. Both
types of variance affect the potential for positive externalities and appropriable
benefits.

31

I discuss demand manifestation below and extensively in An Economic Theory of Infrastructure
and Commons Management. See id.

32

Human capital outputs also may exhibit variance in the potential to generate positive
externalities. To see how, consider the various production processes within the university science
and technology research system that “produce” human capital outputs—specifically, research,
education, training, and socialization.

33

J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for
Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 315, 332 (2003) (Federal grants for basic research is one method by which such
government-funded research “enter[s] the upstream processes of scientific research as an input
available from the public domain.”)
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As a general matter, most universities do not allocate their infrastructural
capital on the basis of commercial prospects in output markets.34 Consequently,
the range of outputs from university science and technology research systems has
not historically been weighted more heavily towards commercial research. This is
not to say that universities have not made significant contributions in the realm of
commercial research—of course, they have35—but rather commercial applications
have not generally been a central objective or priority. Put another way, industry
demand for commercializable research has not driven universities’ resource
allocation decisions—at least, historically.
By the same token, again historically, government research funding has
not been weighted more heavily towards specific commercial ends.36 Yet, at
times, government-funding has yielded research with commercial applications,
and, as the history behind the Bayh-Dole Act tells us,37 such research was
(allegedly) underutilized.38 To solve this problem of underutilized governmentfunded research, intellectual property took on a new role, to which I now turn.39
III.

THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH SYSTEMS

There are many competing theories, justifications, and explanations for the
existence of intellectual property law. The dominant economic justification for
patents outside the university research context is that granting patents over
34

As Auerswald and Branscomb note, researchers tend to allocate their resources—time, money,
graduate student assistance, etc.—according to their “interest in the question posed” which
“contrast[s] sharply with a decision rule based on commercial potential.” Philip E. Auerswald &
Lewis M. Branscomb, Start-ups and Spin-offs: Collective Entrepreneurship Between Invention
and Innovation, in THE EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY 61, 79-80 (Ed., David M. Hart
2003). They also note: “A fundamental challenge involved in taking a project from invention to
innovation is accomplishing the shift from decisions based on the criterion of ‘interestingness’ to
one based on the criterion of commercial value.”
35

See, e.g., Rebecca Henderson, et al., Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology: A
Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
119 (1996).
36

Traditionally, federal research funding has primarily been mission-oriented. See DONNA
FOSSUM ET AL., VITAL ASSETS: FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE
NATION’S UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES 2 (RAND 2004). Recent studies suggest that federal
R&D funds have become increasingly concentrated. Id. at 12 (recent increases in R&D funding to
universities and colleges has been highly focused on medical research).
37

See David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat and Arvids A. Ziedonis, IVORY
TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE
AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT (2004).
38

See Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development, supra note 2, at 1702 (discussing and
critiquing the argument that federally funded research was underutilized); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Technology Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK
163, 163 (1994); Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 2, at 406.
39

But see Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules, supra note 2 (arguing that the primary role
of patents is to facilitate commercialization).
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inventions provides the necessary incentive for private investment in creating the
inventions in the first place—call this the reward (or incentive) theory.40
Information resources face the well-known supply-side problem, common to
public goods: the inability to (cheaply) exclude competitors and nonpaying
consumers (free-riders) presents a risk to investors perceived ex ante (prior to
production of the good), which may lead to undersupply.41 Essentially, in the
absence of patent law, there would be a significant underinvestment in invention
because of the risk that competitors would appropriate the value of the invention.
Granting inventors patents lessens the costs of exclusion, raises the costs of freeriding, encourages licensing, and, as a result, makes a greater portion of the
surplus generated by the invention appropriable by the inventor.
In the university research context, patents have these same effects, but
where research is funded by government, the economic justification is quite
different.42 Simply put, awarding patents for government funded research is
premised on the notion that patents are necessary to facilitate post-patent research,
development and commercialization—call this the commercialization (or
prospect) theory.43 That is, in the absence of patents, government funded research
results would languish underutilized (underdeveloped and undercommercialized)
because (1) the researchers and their host institutions lacked the incentives and/or
capacity to further develop and commercialize the research or to transfer the
research results to industry, and (2) even if transfer was feasible, industry lacked
sufficient incentives to invest in development and commercialization without the
exclusivity made available by patents in the form of exclusive licenses. Elsewhere
I have questioned the strength of these arguments and argued that the classes of
research results for which these arguments justify patents may be quite limited.44
40

See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 119 (3d.
ed. 2003); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1031 (2005).
41

For a certain subset of patentable subject matter, trade secrecy or other mechanisms may
provide sufficient means for appropriating surplus to attract private investment into production.
For this subset, patents may be justified for a variety of reasons associated with disclosure. See
Strandburg, What Does the Public Get, supra note 29.

42

I am concerned in this paper with government funded research. Of course, a significant amount
of university research is funded through other means. See also Peter D. Blumberg, From “Publish
or Perish” to “Profit or Perish”: Revenues from University Technology Transfer and the S
501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 89, 99-100 (1996) (Blumberg details how income
from university research and technology transfer would be affected if a corporate tax rate were
imposed on universities for their work with private actors).
43

While the prospect and commercialization theories of patent law are technically distinct and
have slightly different foci, they share the same theoretical and practical orientation. See Edmund
W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977)
(prospect theory); Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules, supra note 2 (commercialization
theory); Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain
Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1353-57 (2004) (noting that prospect and
commercialization theories derive from the theoretical work of Demsetz); see also Frischmann &
Lemley, Spillovers, supra note 6 (critiquing the Demsetzian approach to intellectual property).
44

See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 2.
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Rather than rehash the arguments and counterarguments, which as noted in the
introduction are the subject of continued debate, let me instead assume for
purposes of argument that the federal policy of allowing federally funded
researchers to patent the research results is warranted. After all, as also noted
earlier, the law only encourages and enables, but does not require, university
patenting and participation in commercialization.
Most analyses of the role of patents in the university research context
focus on the exclusivity of patents: that is, the benefits of exclusivity—increased
appropriation of surplus; increased technology transfer, licensing and related
transactions; increased commercialization; and so on; and the costs of
exclusivity—deadweight losses, increased transaction costs, patent thickets, and
so on. It is important to keep in mind that the benefits and costs of exclusivity are
felt differently by different constituencies within a university and thus may lead to
internal conflicts.
Exclusivity is a supply-side concern that is relevant to assessing how well
markets will function.45 Patents improve exclusion and consequently the supplyside functioning of markets for university research results as well as those markets
further downstream for derivative commercial end-products. Both the reward and
commercialization theories of patent law take patent-enabled exclusivity as the
relevant means for fixing a supply-side problem—essentially, the undersupply of
private investment in the production of patentable subject matter or in the
development and commercialization of patentable subject matter that would occur
in the absence of patent-enabled exclusivity. The theories differ largely in terms
of where in the supply chain patent-enabled exclusivity is needed and of the
degree of control/exclusivity needed to attract investment.
Patent theories take as a given that the market mechanism will best
aggregate information regarding demand for such investment. Put in a slightly
different way, the theories are premised on the notion that private investment into
the production, development and commercialization of patentable subject matter
will be allocated efficiently on the basis of expected returns in downstream
commercial markets, so long as patents are available to provide the necessary

45

Excludability is relevant to a supply-side analysis of whether markets will work efficiently.
(Low cost) exclusion is one key to a well-functioning market. If one can (cheaply) exclude others
from consuming a resource, one can demand payment as a condition for access. If one cannot
(cheaply) exclude others from consuming a resource, then the market may fail to satisfy consumer
demand for the resource (undersupply) because suppliers will not be able to recoup their costs
from consumers. Simply put, a producer of a good needs must exclude you from consuming the
good it has produced if it wishes to charge you for access and consumption. Further, a producer of
a good needs to be able to charge you for access if it wishes to recover its costs. If the costs of
exclusion are high, then producers must either sink these additional costs and charge higher fees,
or run the risk that consumers will “free ride” (i.e., consume the good without paying). Either
route may lead to market failure. Thus, if market provision of a resource is desirable but the costs
of exclusion are too high, then government intervention to “fix” the market may be appropriate.
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exclusivity.46 This certainly makes good sense, so long as we are talking about
private profit-driven investment. But what if investment is not entirely private?
What if demand for research-related outputs and the allocation of
infrastructural capital to the production of such outputs is not determined
accurately by the market mechanism on the basis of expected returns in
downstream commercial markets? What if demand is assessed more efficiently
by non-market processes—involving government, non-profits, or community
organizations, for example?47 What if we are talking about public or community
investment rather than private investment?
As noted above, university science and technology research systems
produce a mix of outputs, some of which may have commercial application, many
of which do not. How, if at all, does the availability of patents in the university
research context affect demand for university science and technology research
system resources?
In An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, I
explain the concept of demand manifestation, which basically concerns how well
consumer demand for infrastructure-dependent outputs translates into demand for
infrastructure in the upstream market. Markets may under-represent social
demand for infrastructure where output producers fail to observe or appropriate
value in output markets. Put another way, the market mechanism exhibits a
predictable bias in favor of outputs that generate observable and appropriable
benefits; to the extent that infrastructure access or infrastructure capital is scarce,
relying on the market mechanism to indicate demand for access or capital may
lead to undersupply of socially desired outputs—specifically, public goods and
non-market goods that yield positive externalities. 48
In the past, universities had not directed their resources toward the
production of commercial outputs for a variety of reasons—public interest
missions, an explicit focus on education of citizenry, the “ivory tower” metaphor
46

See Jack E. Kerrigan & Christopher J. Brasco, The Technology Transfer Revolution: Legislative
History and Future Proposals, 31 PUB. CONT. L. J. 277, 281-82 (2002) (The Stevenson-Wydler
Act led to the development of the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement,
(“CRADA”), which authorized collaborative agreements between federal laboratories and
universities. CRADA also led to the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, whereby
government scientists and private industry could benefit from entering into CRADAs).

47

See Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16; Strandburg, Curiosity
Driven Research, supra note 26;Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the
Firm
, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (comparing market, state, and commons based production as
information processing systems).
48

See Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16 (explaining this dynamic);
see also Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1033 (1989) (discussing a study by Edwin Mansfield which found
that private rates of return were almost half that of the social rates of return such that in hindsight,
private firms would not have invested in research and development of the innovation despite the
social benefits that were ultimately realized).
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and the ideal of insulation from market or government influence, and so on.
Another important reason is that universities had not always been able to
appropriate the benefits of commercially viable research in the absence of patent
protection.
Arguably, the obstacles that patents were introduced to overcome—
insufficient incentives and capacity to develop and commercialize research
results—may have acted as an important buffer between the university science
and technology research system and the marketplace. This is not to say that
universities and industry did not interact. To the contrary, as David Mowery
demonstrates, universities and industry have a long history of interactions.49
Clearly, the buffer has been permeable over time, but (arguably) it may have been
sufficient to insulate system management and resource allocation decisions from
the demands of downstream commercial markets.
Although universities were vertically integrated in the sense that they
produced both the infrastructure and the outputs, the infrastructure remained
generic and the outputs remained mixed because the appropriability of surplus
downstream was not a driving factor in the allocation of infrastructural capital.
Introducing patents into the system, along with a host of other initiatives aimed at
tightening the relationship between universities and industry, may change the
dynamic in a relatively predictable manner.
Demand for university-produced commercial research manifests in
market-driven transactions made possible by patents (e.g., licenses) and critically,
through other university-industry relationships, such an industry sponsorship of
research.50 This creates a demand-pull that, at the margins, may lead to the
creeping optimization of the infrastructure.51 In a realm of limited, scarce
resources and robust competition for prestige, students, and funding, university

49

Mowery shows that the trend of increased patenting behavior by universities occurred prior to
1980 and the passage of Bayh-Dole. He also suggests that while the relationship between
universities and industry may have evolved (been transformed) in the past few decades,
transformation should not be attributed to the Bayh-Dole Act itself. See David Mowery, The
Bayh-Dole Act and High-Technology Entrepreneurship in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or
Something Else?, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS,
DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ELSEVIER SCIENCE/JAI PRESS SERIES: ADVANCES IN THE
STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2005).
50

See Strandburg, Curiosity Driven Research, supra note 26(discussing industry sponsorship of
research and noting this effect); Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing,
Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anti-Commons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 141, 144-45 (2004) (same); see also Reichman & Uhlir, A Contractually
Reconstructed Research Commons, supra note 2, at 341-43 (noting that commercial exploitation
of university research may pressure universities to “hoard” and protect information).
51

This is similar to the current debate over the end-to-end architecture of the Internet, although the
optimization question is much more explicit and immediate in that context. Frischmann,
Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16, at Pt. IV.
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decisions52 about how to allocate upstream infrastructure capital to downstream
production may be biased toward output markets that generate appropriable
returns at the expense of those that generate positive externalities.53
As I argue at greater length elsewhere,54 the market mechanism exhibits a
bias for outputs that generate observable and appropriable benefits at the expense
of outputs that generate positive externalities. This is not surprising because the
whole point of relying on exclusivity—whether provided by traditional property
rights or patents—is to enable private appropriation and discourage externalities.
The problem with relying on the market mechanism is that potential positive
externalities may remain unrealized if they cannot be easily valued and
appropriated by those that produce them, even though society as a whole may be
better off if those potential externalities were actually produced.55
The market mechanism exhibits other biases as well. For instance,
because private discount rates tend to be higher than social discount rates, markets
tend to be biased toward the short term. Among other things, the divergence
between private and social discount rates can lead to overinvestment in applied
research and commensurate underinvestment in basic research.56 Further,
incumbent market actors may act strategically to preserve their market positions
or to control the direction of innovation.57 These two biases introduce further
52

A critical question to consider is who allocates these resources. Kathy Strandburg focuses on
the preferences of basic researchers and the differences between homo economicus and homo
scientificus. See Strandburg, Curiosity Driven Research, supra note 26. I wonder (1) whether
basic researchers are making allocation decisions (I think, no), and (2) whether it is a question of
nature vs. nurture – will scientists evolve? Will changes in the environment lead to slow subtle
changes in the species? These are difficult questions that require further study.
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An empirical study of the allocation of infrastructure capital resources of the types identified
above is needed. The datasets that would useful include, among other things, time spent by
faculty and graduate students on different types of projects; factors in hiring, promotion and tenure
of faculty; and allocation of physical capital such as labs and equipment to general purpose or
dedicated commercial projects.
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Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16.

55

See id.; see also Frischmann & Lemley, Spillovers, supra note 6 (explaining the benefits of
letting the spillovers flow).
56

This bias influences decisions about many infrastructure resources. Id. As a general matter, it
may lead to underinvestment in the maintenance and repair of existing infrastructure. Similarly, it
can lead to overconsumption of environmental resources in the present without due regard to the
costs for future generations, or to technological optimization of the Internet in favor of existing or
reasonably foreseeable applications to the potential detriment of yet-to-be-developed applications.
Id.
57

See, e.g., Arti Rai & Rebecca Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 296 (2003) (Noting that upstream patent may stunt subsequent
research if the patent covers even basic research that would have enabled more development);
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 342 (In seeking opportunities in commercially marketable
research results, universities may “commercialize upstream aggregates of data as research tools
and products.”); Phillip Pardey, Bonwoo Koo, Carol Nottenburg, Creating, Protecting, and Using
Crop Biotechnologies Worldwide in an Era of Intellectual Property, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
213, 225 (2004) (A shift in emphasis may occur away from basic research to applied research as
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dynamic complications associated with path dependence and the costs of
changing directions once a path has been taken.
As noted previously, university science and technology research systems
are inputs into the production of a wide variety of research-related outputs that are
used externally and internally to produce value downstream (which may actually
involve internal cycling for continued use in the university science and
technology research system). There is a real risk that the biases of the market
mechanism will “work their way upstream” and infect/affect university science
and technology research systems. The most obvious manner in which this
dynamic can be expected to operate is simply by way of upstream resource
allocation—in a world of scarce resources (particularly, physical, human, and
financial capital), it should not be surprising to see an emerging preference for
self-supportive activities that yield appropriable benefits that are fed back into the
system. As Reichman and Uhlir conclude, “under Bayh-Dole, universities have
moved away from policies that favor pure research, both for its own sake and as a
tool for advancing higher education. As the costs of education skyrocket, and
government funding fails to keep up in many areas, universities have aggressively
sought to exploit commercial applications of research results, with an eye toward
maximizing returns on investment.”58
Thus, introducing patents into the university research context is not solely
about introducing exclusivity (with its benefits and costs) to fix a supply-side
problem—underutilization, underdevelopment, and undercommercialization of
research results. Introducing patents into the university research context is also, if
not primarily, about manifesting market-driven demand for university-produced
research and more subtly for the infrastructural capital aggregated within
university science and technology research systems.
This should not be surprising. As it has become clearer that innovation is
the engine driving the economy, we should expect pressure to optimize various
institutions to support innovation policy.59 Should universities be optimized to
supply innovation? I think not, at least not as a matter of general public policy.60
universities look for more financially rewarding research); see also David C. Hoffman, A Modest
Proposal: Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing a Broad
Experimental Use Exception. 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1025 (2004) (“As the biotechnology
industry has diversified and become economically viable, the financial incentive provided by
patents has motivated many academic scientists to shift their emphasis from basic to applied
research.”).
58

Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 52 at 341.
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In fact, innovation theory drives similar optimization debates in other infrastructure industries.
Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16, at Pt. IV (similar pressure to
optimize the Internet infrastructure).
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Even if universities should be optimized to supply innovation, what exactly does that mean?
How would such an objective be accomplished? Assuming that promoting innovation were our
sole policy objective, it is not clear what the optimal role of universities would be. The current
trend reflects one of many possibilities. Specifically, the current trend envisions universities as
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As a general matter, I agree with Richard Florida’s argument that an inordinate
focus on innovation “misses the larger economic picture.”
Universities have been naively viewed as “engines” of innovation
that pump out new ideas that can be translated into commercial
innovations and regional growth.
This has led to overly
mechanistic national and regional policies that seek to
commercialize those ideas and transfer them to the private sector.
Although there is nothing wrong with policies that encourage joint
research, this view misses the larger economic picture:
Universities are far more important as the nation’s primary source
of knowledge creation and talent. Smart people are the most
critical resource to any economy, and especially to the rapidly
growing knowledge-based economy on which the U.S. future
rests.61
IV.

STRATEGIES FOR UNIVERSITIES

Some seem to believe that university commercialization is simply
inevitable. In Capitalizing Knowledge, for example, Henry Etzkowitz claims that
the “function of the university” has “irrevocably changed,” that ”[t]here is likely
no return to an earlier era,” and that “the university is changing its organization
and ideology to accommodate its new role in economic development.” Not only
do I disagree, but I find such assertions somewhat hyperbolic and misleading.62
active participants in the post-patent commercialization process, and critically, in the part of the
process that bridges the gap between invention and innovation. Bridging this gap is critical to the
commercialization process and, as Auerswald and Branscomb have argued, a bridge may be
collectively built by university researchers, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and other interested
parties in a sort of collective entrepreneurship. See Philip E. Auerswald & Lewis M. Branscomb,
Start-ups and Spin-offs: Collective Entrepreneurship Between Invention and Innovation, in THE
EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY 61, 79-80 (Ed., David M. Hart 2003). Of course,
building bridges consumes resources. Perhaps universities would better serve innovation policy
by focusing further upstream on the wide variety of inputs necessary for innovation, including
both intellectual and human capital.
61

Richard Florida, The Role of the University: Leveraging Talent, Not Technology, Science and
Technology Online (Summer 1999), at http://www.isues.org/issues/15.4/florida.htm.
62

Similarly, in Entrepreneurial Science: The Second Academic Revolution, Henry Etzkowitz and
Andrew Webster claim that “universities are undergoing a ‘second revolution.’” Henry Etzkowitz
& Andrew Webster, Entrepreneurial Science: The Second Academic Revolution, in CAPITALIZING
KNOWLEDGE: NEW INTERSECTIONS OF INDUSTRY AND ACADEMIA (Etzkowitz et al 1998). I
suppose I might be willing to agree if I also were willing to conclude that the broader
commercialization, privatization and deregulation movement were part of an inevitable revolution
as well. But I do not. Universities (and society more generally) should seriously evaluate such
developments (and attendant claims of inevitable revolution) and not succumb to the dominant
economic mindset without question. See Jennifer Croissant & Sal Restivo, DEGREES OF
COMPROMISE: INDUSTRIAL INTEREST AND ACADEMIC VALUES xi-xii (2001) (“From the early
1980s through the present, commercialization of research has been a consensus policy: Not a
natural “evolution” of research and development practices, but a conscious reprioritization by a
broad coalition of actors.”).
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Universities, like any other organization, must adapt and evolve with changing
economic and social conditions, but each university must determine its own
“ideology” and mission and decide on the extent to which it should participate in
commercialization, entrepreneurship and economic development.
As noted earlier, the U.S. government has made an explicit policy decision
to allow funded entities to obtain patents and thereby has encouraged participation
in the commercialization of federally funded research. Nonetheless, universities
still must decide on the extent to which they wish to participate in the
commercialization process. As a general matter, universities are not required by
law to create technology transfer offices, delay or withhold publication of
research results, patent research results, issue exclusive licenses, or be
entrepreneurs. The Bayh-Dole Act enables universities to participate in the
commercialization process, but it does not obligate or constrain them to pursue
any particular strategy with respect to federally funded research. Universities
remain in the driver’s seat and may decide which road to take and at what speed.
There is no uniform answer for universities to the commercialization
question. The extent to which universities should actively participate in patenting
and commercializing research and to which a university research system should
be directed toward patentable research outputs will vary considerably across
universities. Some universities may have sufficient resources to resist pressure to
optimize the university science and technology research system for commercial
outputs; other universities may not. Some universities may in fact prefer to
optimize, perhaps because of a particular university mission, a vision of the
university role in the modern economy, or strategic reasons related to faculty
recruitment, student recruitment, prestige, or public image. In the end, with
respect to patent policy, technology transfer, commercialization, and
entrepreneurship, universities have choices and face competing incentives. How
to proceed depends upon the particular university’s objectives for its science and
technology research system.
Perhaps idealistically (or even ideologically), I envision robust
competition among universities operating on different models and pursuing
different strategies, missions, and ideologies. Some universities may actively
engage in the commercialization process without affecting their science and
technology research systems. Other universities may need to choose whether to
optimize their science and technology research systems for commercial research
outputs or to sustain a mixed system. In the various markets that universities
compete (for faculty, students, government funds, etc.), different strategies may
be successful. That is, it may be the case that faculty, students, or funding
agencies may look (dis)favorably on optimization. I cannot offer broad
prescriptions for universities regarding what strategy to pursue, but I believe it is
critical that each university carefully evaluate its strategy in light of the demandside considerations I have noted in this essay.
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Those universities that wish to preserve the integrity of their research
systems and resist the pressure to optimize need to affirmatively take steps to
manage conflicts of interests, to insulate from the demands of the marketplace
upstream decisions regarding infrastructural capital allocation (i.e., decisions that
impact the allocation of the five types of aggregated capital resources to particular
types of productive activities), and ultimately to minimize (or eliminate)
dependence upon commercial revenues for sustaining the research system.63
Those universities that wish to optimize their research systems for commercial
outputs should do so explicitly with a full awareness of the risks and rewards.
V.

Conclusion

The issues surrounding commercialization of university research systems
are quite similar to those surrounding the commercialization of mixed
infrastructure, such as the Internet. These resources are similar in terms of the
manner in which they generate social value and in terms of the significant
pressures they face to evolve to serve commercial ends. In some cases, such as
the Internet, technological design creates a buffer that resists optimization and
protects the generic nature of the infrastructure. In other cases, the law may
create a similar buffer.64 In the case of university research systems, traditional
buffers between universities and the market seem to be eroding. In this essay, I
have argued that this ought to be of significant concern to universities and society
more generally because it may lead to a creeping systemic optimization of
university research systems for commercializable outputs—a slow and subtle shift
in the allocation of infrastructure resources, priorities, relationships, norms, and so
on—dictated by the demands of downstream commercial markets. I have not
argued that commercialization of research results is inherently bad or undesirable.
To the contrary, such commercialization ought to be pursued when possible. It is
the commercialization of university science and technology research systems with
which I am concerned. Nor have I argued that universities should not participate
in commercialization. To the contrary, I suggest some should.
Universities face difficult questions about the degree to which and manner
in which they participate in patenting and more generally in the
commercialization process. As I noted in the beginning, to grapple with these
questions, universities must step back from their immediate context, compare
their situation with that of other industrial and social contexts, reflect on their role
in society, and proceed carefully.
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As Kathy Strandburg notes, many of the concerns in this context stem from scarce public
funding. See Strandburg, Curiosity Driven Research, supra note 26.
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For an argument that the Sony rule, which precludes secondary liability in situations where a
technology is “capable of substantial noninfringing uses,” properly limits the scope of copyrights
and acts as a legal buffer against commercialization, see Brett M. Frischmann, Peer-to-Peer
Technology as Infrastructure: An Economic Argument For Retaining Sony's Safe Harbor For
Technologies Capable of Substantial Noninfringing Uses, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOCIETY 329 (2005).
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This essay has introduced the concept of “patent pull” to capture the
demand manifesting quality of patents. Patents “pull” (private and public)
investment to productive activities that would be less attractive in the absence of
patents. Exploring the role of patents from the demand side reveals that beyond
affecting traditional capital investment decisions, patents can have more subtle
and perhaps pervasive impacts on organizations and institutions, including but not
limited to universities. This essay has focused on university research systems;
further research into the role of patents in other systems where government and
other non-market processes fare well in manifesting and processing societal
demand is needed. That patents are introduced into the “normal” market setting
to create distortions is well understood, but the impacts of such distortions upon
priorities and the allocation of infrastructural capital within organizations and
institutions requires further study.
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FIGURE TWO:
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